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“You are not a loan.” 1 
 
Glossolalia is a foreign, natural, or magical (non)language, a kind of linguistic 
state of exception in which the normal rules or experience of signification are 
suspended and something like the true nature of linguistic practice (or its complete 
upheaval!) is made apparent.2 In what follows, I use the figures glossolalia and the 
state of exception, to interrogate Hannah Arendt’s assessment of Heinrich Heine 
and her reading of his Sabbath poetry in her famous essay The Jew as Pariah: A Hidden 
Tradition.3 For Arendt, Heine is caught up with the illusory promise of nature, which 
renders some of his work practically glossolalic and leaves him stuck in a pariah role 
that, while “conscious” and therefore preferable to the other pariah and parvenu 
alternatives, is still a thwarted role without much promise.4 His condition of being 
a pariah, a fragile condition of exposure in a kind of state of exception, is not his 
own fault; it is that of the society that excludes him and of the governments that 
exceptionalize him. Still, when Arendt in her essay examines four exemplary pariahs 
 
* Affiliated Research Professor with the American Bar Foundation and Professor of Modern Culture 
and Media (MCM) and Political Science at Brown University. For comments on very early drafts, I am 
indebted to Miriam Leonard, John Wolfe Ackerman, Chris Tomlins, and participants in the “Law 
As . . .” III symposium, March 2014. Thanks as well to Jonathan Sozek for his help preparing the 
manuscript for publication. 
1. STRIKE DEBT!, strikedebt.org (last visited Mar. 2, 2015). 
2. 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION 3504–07 (Lindsay Jones ed., 2nd ed. 2005). 
3. HANNAH ARENDT, The Jew As Pariah: A Hidden Tradition, in THE JEWISH WRITINGS 275 
( Jerome Kohn & Ron H. Feldman eds., 2007). 
4. Id. On the notion of a “conscious pariah,” see also HANNAH ARENDT, We Refugees, in THE 
JEWISH WRITINGS, supra note 3, at 264, 274. 
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and their tactics of resilience, she is not only canvassing the variety of ways in which 
individuals respond to such situations, she is also assessing them. 
I. HEINE’S HIDDEN TRADITION 
In “The Jew as Pariah,” Arendt names Heine as one of four exemplary Jewish 
pariahs, each of whom contributes to a repertoire, or to what she calls a “hidden 
tradition,” of action, by responding resiliently, albeit individually, to discrimination 
and oppression.5 The four are Heinrich Heine, Bernard Lazare (the Dreyfusard), 
Kafka’s K. (the protagonist of The Castle), and Charlie Chaplin. Between the 
isolation of the pariah and the self-betraying inclusions of the parvenu, Arendt 
locates a third way, that of the “conscious pariah,” who does not seek mere social 
inclusion, but does not merely accept his pariah status either.6 Instead, he stakes a 
claim to a place in the world whether by demanding inclusion, voicing righteous 
outrage, claiming his (sometimes nonexistent) rights, or mocking authorities.7 At 
least three of these four particular tactics of the conscious pariah are evident in 
Heine’s Sabbath poetry, which Arendt singles out for attention, but the first is most 
prominent. Still, Arendt seems less enthralled by Heine than by her other three 
exemplary pariahs. That is partly because she is skeptical of Heine’s naturalism, 
which is subject to the limitations of all Romantic introspection and fancy (and is 
more evident elsewhere in his oeuvre), and perhaps also because she finds his 
demand for inclusion inadequate, certainly not enough to compensate for his own 
tendency to self-exception and withdrawalism. 
Heine writes poetry in the language of the nation that marginalizes him, 
Arendt points out in her antiglossolalic reading of him, as she admires the audacity 
with which, in his Sabbath poetry, he puts cholent, or (as Heine puts it, using the 
German) schalet, the lowly Sabbath bean stew, on the table alongside the nectar of 
the gods.8 But both gestures are limited and ultimately inefficacious in Arendt’s 
view.9 Although Heine pictured himself, a poet, as always dwelling in a state of 
Sabbath glory,10 for most Jews, the Sabbath only punctuates the week and does not 
 
5. ARENDT, supra note 3, at 276–77. On Arendt as a theorist of “hidden traditions,” see also 
Ariella Azoulay, Outside the Political Philosophy Tradition and Still Inside Tradition: Two Traditions of  Political 
Philosophy, 18 CONSTELLATIONS 91 (2011). 
6. ARENDT, supra note 3, at 283–86. 
7. Arendt takes Bernard Lazare’s tactic to be exemplary: he is a conscious pariah, she says, who 
does not yield to prejudice or internalize it. ARENDT, supra note 3, at 283–86. Rather, he wears the 
badge of pariah with pride, rejects assimilation on anyone else’s terms, and tries to force into existence 
a world differently constituted. Id. Arendt also admires K., the protagonist of Kafka’s The Castle, who 
is turned aside, marginalized, and thwarted wherever he turns—she reads him as a Jew who, she says, 
again and again insists on his rights until his very last breath. Id. at 288–96. And she admires Charlie 
Chaplin, who animates the downtrodden and shows them getting away with things. Id. at 286–88. He 
plays the trickster to the always buffoonish policers of social norms and profiteers of the new modern 
economy. Id. 
8. Id. at 281–82. 
9. Id. at 276, 282. 
10. Id. at 282. 
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permeate it (though we shall see, there are other readings to be offered here, both 
of Heine and of the Sabbath). 
Later in “The Jew as Pariah,” Arendt approaches Kafka’s K. in The Castle in 
the same way, as indeed she does all four of her exemplars—admiringly, but with 
reservations.11 K. is also a pariah figure and also conscious. He insistently claims 
membership in the community of universal human rights, but he is never granted 
access or equality.12 Thwarted at every turn, he finally dies alone, exhausted. His 
actions, in Arendt’s estimation, are slightly more political than Heine’s, since K. 
seeks political equality, not the preciousness and isolation of genius that so often 
seduces the pariah, nor the social membership (which is never fully granted to Jews 
in Enlightened Europe) that attracts the parvenu.13 But in the end, K.’s aspirations, 
though more political, are no more effective than Heine’s efforts, perhaps because 
K. too acts alone. This is a limitation of the pariah situation as such, not of the 
pariah, who does what he can. Or, perhaps better, it is both. 
But Heine does not only covertly sneak Jewish things and themes into the 
universal; this is one of his tactics in poetry, but there are others. Arendt regards 
European culture as the destination of Heine’s “homespun Judaism of everyday 
life,” and she admires the trajectory, while also communicating, however, some 
derision for the home as a site of falsely promised safety or security.14 The promise 
is false because retreat to the home is an abdication of one’s responsibility for the 
world (although again, the pariah’s situation is such that a full assumption of such 
responsibility is hardly to be expected). Arendt errs, however, in locating Heine so 
centrally in the domain of the homespun. That location obscures a rather important 
detail: the poem’s point of departure. 
The poem begins with the Arabian Tales, in particular with their stories of 
transformation from human to animal or monster, in which a cursed prince or noble 
is condemned by magic to life as a beast with only occasional, temporary restoration 
to human form.15 Such tales are part of an age-old repertoire of resilience in which 
not even a transmogrifying curse can succeed in totally erasing the true self, which 
reemerges from time to time. The structure of these events is something like that 
of the state of exception—a new normal of exceptional beastliness is secured, then 
occasionally suspended as the human returns or appears, albeit only for a time 
before lapsing back into the cursed creaturely state. But how should we understand 
that reassertion or reemergence from creaturely life to human form? And how 
should we understand Heine’s turn to the Arabian Tales for such a resource when 
he, a self-professed Grecophile, had ready access to Ovid and his Metamorphoses with 
 
11. See id. at 288–96. 
12. See id. at 290–91. 
13. See id. at 289. 
14. Id. at 282. 
15. Heinrich Heine, Princess Sabbath, in THE STANDARD BOOK OF JEWISH VERSE 253, 253–54 
(George Alexander Kohut ed., 1917). 
Honig_production read v3 (clean) (Do Not Delete) 6/17/2015  10:46 PM 
466 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:463 
which to narrate what in the English translation of Princess Sabbath is referred to as 
“canine metamorphosis”?16 
The periodic return to the human state may be merciful or it may be cruel. It 
is merciful in that it grants the victim some respite from his fate. It is cruel in that it 
makes the victim into the knowing bearer, week after week, of his awful fate. 
Perhaps the point is that one cannot have one without the other; mercy and cruelty 
become one in the accursed state. But there is also another more interesting point 
to note here. Heine’s poem seems to suggest that the release from animality is a 
result of the curse’s self-weakening or self-suspension, almost a kind of 
autoimmunity. The suggestion misleads though and obscures another suggestion in 
the poem: the possibility that release may also be taken and not just suffered or 
granted. It may be an effect of power or agency, and not just of exceptional self-
suspension. That is, it may testify not to the weakness of the curse, or the mercy (or 
cruelty!) of the curser, but rather to the resilience, agency, and power of its sufferer. 
II. GREEK, JEWISH, AND ARABIAN TALES: TAKING SABBATH 
Heine, the first of Arendt’s four Jewish pariah figures, eventually converted to 
Christianity. This goes unmentioned by Arendt, who singles out his qualities as a 
poet-dreamer—he is the self-named “lord of dreams”—besotted by nature and 
attracted to it because of its indifference to prejudice.17 (The sun rises every day 
over all of us regardless of class or caste.18) While Arendt seems to label Heine a 
fool, albeit a clever one, she also clearly admires his way with the German language 
and goes on in her essay to particularly praise his Sabbath poetry: 
In his poem “Princess Sabbath,” the first of his Hebrew Melodies, Heinrich 
Heine depicts for us the national background from which he sprang and 
which inspired his verses. He portrays his people as a fairy prince turned 
by witchcraft into a dog. A figure of ridicule throughout the week, every 
Friday night he suddenly regains his mortal shape, and freed from the 
preoccupations of his canine existence (von huendischen Gedanken), goes forth 
like a prince to welcome the sabbath bride and to greet her with the 
traditional hymeneal, “Lecha Dodi.”19 
What Arendt particularly admires is the audacity with which Heine, in this poem, 
puts schalet, the lowly stew of beans and meat, onto the table of the gods: 
“Schalet, ray of light immortal! 
Schalet, daughter of Elysium!” 
So had Schiller’s song resounded, 
 
16. And how to account for the fact that Arendt missed this key theme in Heine given her 
interest in this same essay in Kafka, also author of a “metamorphosis” tale? See ARENDT, supra note 3, 
at 288–96. 
17. Id. at 280 (“[T]he pariah is always remote and unreal; whether as schlemiel or as ‘lord of 
dreams’ he stands outside the real world and attacks it from without.”). 
18. Though we may add that some live in its heat or glare, while others live lives insulated from 
such exposure. What it means to be under the sun varies and signals inequality. 
19. Id. at 277. 
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Had he ever tasted schalet, 
For this schalet is the very 
Food of heaven, which, on Sinai, 
God Himself instructed Moses 
In the secret of preparing, 
. . . . 
Yes, this schalet’s pure ambrosia 
Of the true and only God: 
Paradisal bread of rapture; 
And, with such a food compared, 
The ambrosia of the pagan, 
False divinities of Greece, 
Who were devils ‘neath disguises, 
Is the merest devils’ offal.20 
But Arendt overlooks something crucially important. She limits the dynamic of the 
poem to its German and Jewish strands. Her reference to the mentions of Greek 
divinities—“Heine places the fare of Princess Sabbath on the table of the gods, 
beside nectar and ambrosia”—does not belie this, since German national identity 
was Grecophilic in Heine’s lifetime, just as it was in hers over two centuries later.21 
Alongside the Greek though, Heine places the Semitic, and when Arendt says that 
European culture is the destination of Heine’s poem, she obscures this rather 
important detail.22 
The Arabian Tales, only recently in Heine’s time translated into German, 
provide the poem with a template of transformation from human to animal or 
monster: “In Arabia’s book of fable / We behold enchanted princes / Who at times 
their form recover, / Fair as first they were created.”23 In these tales, a cursed prince 
or noble is condemned by magic to life as a beast with only the occasional respite 
of temporary restoration to human form. These tales of metamorphosis are part of 
an age-old repertoire of resilience in which not even a transmogrifying curse can 
succeed in totally erasing the true self, which reasserts itself from time to time. They 
are the archive into which Heine impresses the Sabbath ritual, in which the lowest 
 
20. Heine, supra note 15, at 256–57. 
21. ARENDT, supra note 3, at 281–82. 
22. Matthew Arnold obscured Heine’s multiculturalism, avant la lettre, as well as casting Heine 
as the perfect blend of Jew and Greek, denationalizing his Germanness and obscuring his glossolalic 
sources: 
He himself had in him both the spirit of Greece and the spirit of Judaea . . . . By his perfection 
of literary form, by his love of clearness, by his love of beauty, Heine is Greek; by his 
intensity, by his untamableness, by his ‘longing which cannot be uttered,’ he is Hebrew. 
GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, THE JEWISH ODYSSEY OF GEORGE ELIOT 60 (2009) (quoting MATTHEW 
ARNOLD, ESSAYS LITERARY & CRITICAL 121 (1907)). On Arnold, see also MIRIAM LEONARD, 
SOCRATES AND THE JEWS: HELLENISM AND HEBRAISM FROM MOSES MENDELSSOHN TO SIGMUND 
FREUD 120–26, 133 (2012). 
23. Heine, supra note 15, at 253. 
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Jewish man becomes a king in his house once a week as he welcomes the Sabbath 
bride. “Of a prince by fate thus treated / Is my song. His name is Israel, / And a 
witch’s spell has changed him / To the likeness of a dog”;24 a “dog, with dog’s 
ideas,” actually (“von huendischen Gedanken”).25 This is how the Jew (but not the poet-
dreamer) lives all week long, as “a dog, with dog’s ideas.” But the Sabbath suspends 
the ordinary relations of social hierarchy. On this one day each week, the Jew is 
dignified, a follower of God, a (dog)man out of time.26 
Arendt sees in Heine’s Sabbath poetry a particular pariah tactic—the effort to 
insinuate oneself or one’s culture into the universal. When Heine puts the Jewish 
Sabbath stew, cholent, on the table with the gods’ nectar and ambrosia, he seats the 
abject Jew of modern Europe at the table of universal myth. Later, Arendt reads K. 
in The Castle (by the author of a different metamorphosis story) in a similar way, as 
an insistent, if always thwarted, claimant of membership in the community of 
universal human rights. 
But there is also something else in Heine’s Sabbath poem that Arendt 
overlooks. In an odd way, I think, Arendt misses the Sabbath in the Sabbath poetry, 
or (what I want to call) the “Sabbath-power.” This may be precisely because she 
reads past the poem’s Arabian point of departure and also misses the poem’s subtle 
suggestions of a possible departure from the Arabian Tales’ template, as Heine 
borrows it. 
In the Arabian Tales, Heine says, the human is cursed into a creaturely existence 
out of which humanity reemerges from time to time. Similarly, in the Sabbath 
poetry, a witch’s curse makes us creaturely—but the condition is not 
uninterruptable: “[O]n every Friday evening, / On a sudden, in the twilight, / The 
enchantment weakens, ceases, / And the dog once more is human.”27 How should 
we understand this interruption, this weakening, this cessation, this suspension? The 
time arrives, the spell is suspended, and the cursed dog is returned to human form. 
Heine’s wording suggests that the spell is self-suspending, “[o]n a sudden, in the 
twilight.” Just as in the Arabian Tales, as he reports them, the spell is weakened and 
a return to human form ensues. “And his father’s halls he enters / As a man, with 
man’s emotions, / Head and heart alike uplifted, / Clad in pure and festal 
raiment.”28 (Note the brilliance of the contrast between “a dog, with dog’s ideas” 
and “a man, with man’s emotions.” The true human self is a self of human feelings.) 
The one cursed by the spell passively enjoys its suspension and endures its return—
when he “[s]eems to feel the icy fingers / Of a witch upon his heart” he “[s]hudders, 
fearful of the canine / Metamorphosis that waits him.”29 
But what brackets this in the poem, a thick description of ritual welcome and 
 
24. Id. at 254. 
25. Id.; see also ARENDT, supra note 3, at 277. 
26. See Heine, supra note 15, at 254. 
27. Id. at 254. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 257. 
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goodbye to the Sabbath, suggests something a bit different: that the human returns 
not passively, not by dint of the exceptional curse’s self-weakening and return, but 
rather by actions the cursed himself takes to welcome the Sabbath and later bid it 
goodbye. Might it be the practice of Sabbath welcome that reawakens the Sabbath 
in the one who is cursed? Might it be that Sabbath is not just given (via an 
autoimmune defect or mercy of the curse), but that it is rather taken, taken by the 
resilient agency that is never quite extinguished by the curse of everyday existence? 
(Or both?)30 Evidence for this comes in the poem when Heine details the sensorial 
unfolding of the Sabbath welcome ritual: the lamps are lit (“Golden lights of 
consolation”31), the candles are aflame, the Torah shrine is visible, and the Torah 
itself is clothed in silk and precious stone; one hears first the trills and murmurs of 
preparation, and then, more audibly, the resounding notes of the Sabbath song. 
Similarly, the Sabbath does not simply end at an appointed time. We return 
ourselves to the everyday, we transition to it, by way of transitional objects and 
ritual—the spice box, the multibraided candle, the cup of wine—and by way of the 
glossolalic sensorium to which they invite us: the peppery-sweet smell of spice, the 
brightness of the light of the multibraided candle in the darkness, and the acrid smell 
and sound of its flame crackling into the wine that quenches its light. 
That is, there is here an intimation of something more than the perpetual 
rhythmic falling away and return of a curse conducted by an agency not our own. 
There are hints of a counterpower made up of people, roles, things, smells, and 
tastes; a dense cultural sensorial synagogue that acts to wrest humanity or sacredness 
from the creaturely world of the everyday and manage the return to the everyday or 
the secular. It is as if the Sabbath-power not only testifies to the overlife of the 
Arabian magic on which Heine models shtetl life, in which the Jew is cursed to be a 
dog forever. Perhaps it even undoes the Arabian Tales’ magical curses. In the Arabian 
Tales’ template, we await the moment of the curse’s suspension; in some versions 
of the Sabbath, we do the same. But in the Sabbath practice of Sabbath-power, the 
cursed take their humanity back—for a moment. They do so as human-animals, 
however, for the Jew in the sensorial synagogue is not the cursed and abject dog of 
the everyday, and not a dog with dog’s ideas. He is a man with man’s emotions, but 
he is also a sensorial creature, a man who is moved (dog-like?) by his senses: sight, 
smell, and taste. Here we see how the above-mentioned brilliance of the contrast 
between “a dog, with dog’s ideas” and “a man, with man’s emotions” has the effect 
of both hinting at but also obscuring the sensorial and the glossolalic life of the 
dog/man, who even when he is returned to human form each week, remains 
marked by his canine existence.32 
 
30. I suppose this argument has certain continuities with the case I made in BONNIE HONIG, 
EMERGENCY POLITICS: PARADOX, LAW, DEMOCRACY 106–11 (2009), for the dependence of the 
sovereign state of exception on popular subscription. 
31. Heine, supra note 15, at 254. 
32. And vice versa, we may say. Think of Tiresias, the ancient Greek prophet who was, early in 
his life, briefly metamorphosed into a woman, then back to a man. As a man, he was not untouched by 
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Why did Arendt read past all this in Heine? Did she see the Arabian Tales as in 
some way like his naturalism and similarly glossolalic? But glossolalia is not just 
nonsensical (if it is that); it is also magical, and some magic is what we, with Heine, 
here seek. Besides, all of Arendt’s exemplary pariahs in “The Jew as Pariah” have 
the power of metamorphosis. All metamorphose—or try to—with greater or lesser 
degrees of success (K. succeeds the least) and with greater or lesser dependence on 
outside agencies (Chaplin is spurned by his audience, she says, and Lazare never 
gains a following). Why not call especial attention to the metamorphoses in Heine 
too (that is, to those found in the Arabian Tales), rather than focus solely, as Arendt 
seems to do, on Heine’s effort to secure entry into German culture by way of ancient 
Greece, as well as by way of a parodic mimicry of Schiller, whose Hymn to Joy is here 
in play?33 
Had she noted Heine’s turn to the Arabian Tales, Arendt might have seen him 
as even more the conscious pariah than she thought. For his turn to the Arabian 
Tales occurred in the context of an Enlightenment German orientalism which split 
the Orient it exoticized into high and low, and sought to identify the Indo-European 
Oriental with Germany, while casting aside as low or vulgar the Semitic, which is to 
say the Arabian.34 Traces of the latter ugliness are discernible in Heine’s own poem 
(which refers to the dog as the “Butt of mocking city Arabs”35), but still, when 
confronted with the resources of German orientalism, Heine chose to take his 
bearings from the more abject of the exoticized options—the Arabian, which is to 
say, the other Semitic figure. So even as he sought a way to win acceptance for 
Judaism, the way he chose to take was not just the one a parvenu might choose, that 
of using the dominant culture’s most capitalized sources, he also chose to use the 
least.36 This is a mark of the conscious pariah, as also is Heine’s gentle faith in 
human agency and resilience, communicated through the poem’s scenes of ritual, 
sensorial, transitional attachment. 
III. MAKING SABBATH 
That Heine invites us to see the agency in the creaturely approach to Sabbath 
and not just in the Sabbath magic as it is extended to creaturely life is an idea we 
may explore by attending further to the role he accords to the transitional objects 
that help to usher his protagonist in and out the animal and human worlds. Here 
D.W. Winnicott, the object relations theorist who coined the term “transitional 
 
this experience and could report on and compare the two states when asked to do so by Zeus and Hera 
(at his peril). 
33. See FRIEDRICH SCHILLER, Hymn to Joy, in THE POEMS OF SCHILLER 63 (BiblioBazaar 2009) 
(1785). 
34. On this point, I am indebted to Miriam Leonard and her discussion of Heine and Matthew 
Arnold in LEONARD, supra note 22, at 120–26. 
35. Heine, supra note 15, at 254. 
36. Also in his reference to the Almemor, “Proudly flame the candles also / On the rails of the 
Almemor[,]” Heine stages the intimate connections between the two Semitic traditions: the almemor, 
indebted to the Arabic for “platform,” is the (Hebrew) bimah, the synagogue’s raised platform. See id. 
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objects,”37 is a useful interlocutor. Winnicott’s “transitional objects” are things that 
not only provide transition but also inculcate in us a sense of worldly permanence. 
Thus, the candles, the Torah wrappings, and the spice box do transition us in and 
out of the sacred and the secular.38 But they do still more. 
Winnicott says it is in relation to objects, in particular through object use and 
play, that we come to apprehend worldly permanence and acquire some of it 
ourselves.39 In his account of object relations, resilience is a key trait of both objects 
and the subjects who use them. Through play with transitional objects, initially by 
way of “first possession[s],” like a blanket or teddy bear, Winnicott says, the baby 
comes to know a reality beyond herself.40 When the baby cathects onto that object, 
she acquires the emotional resources to withstand the disappointments of the 
mother figure or caregiver and comes to feel she may safely rage against them.41 
When she exercises control over the blanket, hiding and finding it, for example, as 
in Freud’s fort-da game, Freud says she learns mastery or control.42 But Winnicott 
emphasizes a different, perhaps even the opposite, lesson: that of object-
permanence.43 The child’s blanket can survive the child’s rage and also her love, 
which can be powerful and destructive.44 
On Winnicott’s account of transitional objects, we destroy the objects we use, 
and they survive. We fantasize destroying them, and they survive. We love them for 
this, for their resilience. And in loving them, we acquire some of that resilience. It 
rubs off on us, as it were. As Winnicott says, when he argues for a shift in focus 
from object relations to object use: 
This change (from relating to usage) means that the subject destroys the 
object. From here it could be argued by an armchair philosopher that there 
is therefore no such thing in practice as the use of an object; if the object 
 
37. D.W. Winnicott, The Use of an Object, 50 INT’L J. PSYCHOANALYSIS 711, 711 (1969). 
38. Tactile and sensory, they enfold us in their sensorium too. It may be important to distinguish 
the sensorial from the object-relations in some contexts. Here, I think it is just important to note the 
many registers on which these things work or fail to. 
39. Winnicott, supra note 37, at 711–14. 
40. See D.W. WINNICOTT, PLAYING AND REALITY 1–25 (1971), as well as D.W. WINNICOTT, 
THE CHILD, THE FAMILY, AND THE OUTSIDE WORLD 167–72 (1st prtg. 1992) [hereinafter 
WINNICOTT, THE CHILD]. This is an epistemological claim in Winnicott. I extend it, elsewhere, to the 
realm of ethics and politics. See Bonnie Honig, Public Things (April 2013) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author). 
41. See WINNICOTT, THE CHILD, supra note 40, at 62, for a discussion of infant rage: “[I]f a 
baby cries in a state of rage and feels as if he has destroyed everyone and everything, and yet the people 
round him remain calm and unhurt, this experience greatly strengthens his ability to see that what he 
feels to be true is not necessarily real, that fantasy and fact, both important, are nonetheless different 
from each other.” 
42. See 18 SIGMUND FREUD, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, in THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE 
COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 7, 14–17 ( James Strachey et al. eds. & 
trans., 1955). 
43. Winnicott, supra note 37, at 713. 
44. Survival is key for Winnicott. See id. at 713. Compare Arendt, who says that the “common 
world can survive the coming and going of the generations only to the extent that it appears in public.” 
HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 55 (2nd ed. 1998). 
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be external, then the object is destroyed by the subject. Should the 
philosopher come out of his chair and sit on the floor with his patient, 
however, he will find that there is an intermediate position. In other words, 
he will find that after ‘subject relates to object’ comes ‘subject destroys 
object’ (as it becomes external); and then [i.e. after destruction!] may come 
‘object survives destruction by the subject.’45 
“But,” he continues, 
there may or may not be survival. A new feature thus arrives in the theory 
of object-relating. The subject says to the object: ‘I destroyed you’, and the object is 
there to receive the communication. From now on the subject says: ‘Hullo object!’ 
‘I destroyed you.’ ‘I love you.’ ‘You have value for me because of your 
survival of my destruction of you.’ ‘While I am loving you I am all the time 
destroying you in (unconscious) fantasy.’ Here fantasy begins for the individual. 
The subject can now use the object that has survived. It is important to note that it 
is not only that the subject destroys the object because the object is placed 
outside the area of omnipotent control. It is equally significant to state this the 
other way round and to say that it is the destruction of the object that places the object 
outside the area of the subject’s omnipotent control. In these ways the object develops its 
own autonomy and life, and (if it survives) contributes in to the subject, according to its 
own properties.46 
Note how, for Winnicott, the capacity to survive destruction is both a trait we 
grant to the object (in fantasy) and a trait we acquire from objects, by way of a kind 
of (unnamed) transference. We destroy the objects and they survive. Thanks to 
them and to us—for it is our fantasy and not just their factical reality that makes 
this happen—so, thanks to them and to us, when we are destroyed, we survive. 
Resilience is what the autonomous object “contributes in to the subject, according to its own 
properties.” This happens when there is a good enough “holding environment”47 that 
allows for these transactions or transferences to occur. One of the things that makes 
a holding environment good is that it offers up objects that are sturdy enough to 
underwrite the infant’s object relations by surviving the changing mood, play, and 
use of the infant. 
In sum, on Winnicott’s account, object permanence (though this is not his 
term) makes fantasy possible, and fantasy makes permanence possible. The object 
“contributes in” to the subject its own resilience, which is testified to when the 
object survives the often-aggressive use to which it is put in play or anger or love. 
From this Winnicottian perspective then, let us consider again whether it is not 
simply the arrival of the Sabbath that interrupts the curse of the everyday, but rather 
our own welcome of the Sabbath in the company of seemingly inanimate things. 
These things have a charm, and using them is rather like rubbing Aladdin’s lamp: 
 
45. Winnicott, supra note 37, at 713. 
46. Id. (emphases added). 
47. Id. at 711. 
Honig_production read v3 (clean) (Do Not Delete) 6/17/2015  10:46 PM 
2015] THE LAWS OF THE SABBATH (POETRY) 473 
our action releases their magics.48 Anticipation of their magics may also release our 
action. In the case of Winnicott’s objects, the magic is the resilience that is then 
“contributed in” to the subject, who acquires thereby the fantasy that his existence 
is prior to those things and a guarantor of their existence, rather than a (by)product 
of their own prior and thingly agency. Thing and fantasy work together to produce 
the bundle of resilience and agency that I am here calling Sabbath-power.49 
IV. SABBATH-POWER 
It is worth insisting on the idea of Sabbath-power as the agency of the 
Sabbatical suspension of temporality and inequality—social as well as economic—
because these inequalities do not normally just yield or give way from time to time. 
They must be actively interrupted through assertions of counter-sovereignty or 
Sabbath-power. The sabbatical is the suspension of the secular, the opening to the 
sacred that occurs in the cessation or, better, if Franz Rosenzweig is correct, in the 
intensification of the everyday.50 The dog with dog’s ideas is reborn, weekly, as a 
man possessed of dignity, even a king; one possessed of the monarchical power to 
declare (via his own Sabbath hymn, sung with others) the very state of exception by 
way of which he has already emerged into view. This is a different state of exception 
from that imagined by Carl Schmitt.51 In the Sabbatical state of exception, all 
divisions are meant to disappear, rather than to be (re)inscribed. Friend/enemy, 
rich/poor, educated/illiterate, are all equal on Heine’s Sabbath, just as the Sabbath 
food, cholent, the lowly stew of beans with meat, shares a table with the regal dishes 
of the gods (and tastes better than them, Heine says, so distinctions remain). On 
the Sabbath, the day of rest, the laws of social division are suspended and everyone 
is a king (but not a queen, so one law, that of patriarchy, which is every law, remains 
in force). 
Sabbath-power is not just an arcane name for a dated idea. Current practices 
of debt forgiveness, like those of Strike Debt, claim the legacy of the Biblical Jubilee, 
 
48. In response to this claim, Frances Lang reminds me of this passage from the Midrash Rabbah, 
cited in a Passover Haggadah: 
As the rabbis have written in the Midrash Rabbah, commenting upon a verse of Exodus 
(XVI:22): “And the Children of Israel went into the midst of the sea upon the dry ground. How is this 
possible? If they went into the sea, then why does it say ‘upon the dry ground?’ And if they 
went ‘upon the dry ground,’ then why does it say ‘into the midst of the sea’? This is to teach 
that the sea was divided only after Israel had stepped into it and the waters had reached their 
noses, only then did it become dry land.” Their action was the miracle, their action created 
the miracle. 
Arthur Waskow, Their Action Created the Miracle, in IN EVERY GENERATION: A TREASURY OF 
INSPIRATION FOR PASSOVER AND THE SEDER 85, 86 (Sidney Greenberg & Pamela Roth eds., 1998). 
The idea that miracles depend on human (and not just divine) action is fundamental to Rosenzweig, as 
I argue in HONIG, supra note 30, at 95–98. 
49. Read in the context of Heine’s tale of transformation from dog with dog’s ideas to man with 
man’s emotions, we can see the power of the analogy between Winnicott’s transitional objects and those 
of the Sabbath ritual. The latter provide the adult with the magic of the baby’s blanket; both underwrite 
the acquisition of the emotional resources needed to withstand the world’s disappointments. 
50. HONIG, supra note 30, at 96–97. 
51. Id. at 96. 
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the Sabbath of Sabbaths on which, every forty-nine or fifty years, all debts are 
dismissed and the human race restarts.52 The Jubilee year is sacred—it is a time of 
freedom and of celebration when everyone will receive back their original property, 
and slaves will return home to their families.53 Strike Debt, with its “Rolling Jubilee” 
project, takes it bearings from this Biblical practice.54 However, in the Biblical text, 
slaves and debts are released at a certain time (as Heine’s poem at first seems to 
suggest, and as Arendt seems to read it).55 Now, in our own time, the agency of 
Sabbath-power is required. The Rolling Jubilee project does not wait for the Jubilee 
year. Instead, it acts; it buys debt randomly and cheaply, not with the aim of 
collecting the debt but with the aim of abolishing it.56 Other examples of Sabbath-
power are the land reclamation efforts of new farm movements, latter day 
expressions of ancient land sabbatical requirements that relax land ownership rules 
every seven years and give the land—and accreted practices of ownership and 
inequality—a rest, so that new formations and new practices of ownership or 
cultivation may arise.57 These examples show how Sabbath-power puts some “slack 
in the order,” and perhaps points beyond it, rather than working, like the more 
conventionally understood state of exception, to return the order to its tight 
Schmittian essence of division or partition, or (like the operation of destituent 
 
52. As Dienst says, the Jubilee “has a long history.” RICHARD DIENST, THE BONDS OF DEBT 
179 (2011) (citing Leviticus 25 and Luke 4:18). Drawing on PETER LINEBAUGH & MARCUS REDIKER, 
THE MANY-HEADED HYDRA: SAILORS, SLAVES, COMMONERS, AND THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE 
REVOLUTIONARY ATLANTIC 292 (2000), Dienst notes that the Jubilee keeps “returning to inspire 
revolutionary political movements,” as in the cases of 
seventeenth-century English radicals and the eighteenth-century Atlantic working class. . . . 
As it was crystallized and circulated by the Jamaican Robert Wedderburn, son of an enslaved 
woman and a slave master, the notion of Jubilee led “in one direction to the general strike 
and Chartist land policy of the 1830’s and in another direction to the abolition of slavery in 
America.” 
DIENST, supra, at 179–80 (citing LINEBAUGH & REDIKER, supra). Dienst concludes, though (in a way 
that parallels my own engagement with Agamben below), that Jubilee represents just one of two 
necessary attitudes to debt in the current capitalist formation, arguing that “we cannot choose between 
these two attitudes. If the Utopia of microcredit imagines how economics might be conceived as 
universal mutual obligation . . . the Utopia of Jubilee imagines how economics as we know it can be 
jettisoned by an act of collective will.” Id. at 185. 
53. Leviticus 25:10 (New International Version). 
54. A Bailout of the People for the People, ROLLING JUBILEE, http://rollingjubilee.org (last visited 
Aug. 23, 2014); see also DIENST, supra note 52, at 184–85. 
55. Leviticus, supra note 53. 
56. On randomness as a principle of justice, see Bonnie Honig, By the Numbers, in 3 THE JEWISH 
POLITICAL TRADITION (Michael Walzer et al. eds.) (forthcoming 2015). On the creditocracy that 
makes Sabbath-power especially necessary, see Andrew Ross, Welcome to the Creditocracy, Where Your Debt 
Piles Up Forever, GUARDIAN (Mar. 4, 2014, 7:15 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2014/mar/04/household-debt-relief-creditocracy. 
57. On land occupation in the global south and food sovereignty movements in the United 
States, see Rebecca Tarlau, Gill Tract Occupation Follows International Strategy for Land Reclamation, DAILY 
CALIFORNIAN (May 7, 2012), http://www.dailycal.org/2012/05/07/gill-tract-occupation-follows-
international-strategy-for-land-reclamation. 
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power in Agamben) stepping outside of the order altogether to some aneconomic 
alternative (about which more below).58 
It is difficult to draw inspiration from these ancient Sabbath practices without 
reminding ourselves of their powerful modern critic, Hegel, who in his Early 
Theological Writings is quite critical of the Sabbatical practices of the Jews.59 He 
contrasts Judaic and ancient Greek practices of land sabbatical or redistribution and 
finds the former wanting because they are not premised on land or community but 
on relation to divinity: 
[T]he subordination of civil rights to the law of the land, an institution of 
the Mosaic state has a striking resemblance to the situation created in their 
republics by two famous legislators, though its source is very different. In 
order to avert from their states the danger threatening to freedom from the 
inequality of wealth, Solon and Lycurgus restricted property rights in 
numerous ways and set various barriers to the freedom of choice which 
might have led to unequal wealth.60 
The Greek practices have their source, Hegel says, in concerns about the 
consequence of “the inequality which would otherwise have arisen,” including the 
possibility of “political annihilation.”61 The Judaic practice, by contrast, was not, per 
se, political. It “was not a consequence of equality of rights in land, but of equality 
in having no rights in it at all.”62 
The problem for Hegel here is that the object in relation to which we acquire 
subjectivity is never possessed on the Biblical account, and so the thing, as it were, 
cannot do the work: it has no magic. The land is God’s, it is said in Leviticus,63 and 
the people who dwell there are said by God (Hegel points out) to be “strangers and 
sojourners with me.”64 In Winnicottian terms, Hegel is here saying that the object 
(the land) cannot transfer its permanence to its subjects because the object, which 
never really belongs to them, lacks precisely the properties needed to transfer the 
gift of permanence the subjects seek.65 Thus, the Jewish Sabbatical can only function 
as a reminder of this unique situation of nonownership and dependence on the 
 
58. On slack, see WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, POLITICS AND AMBIGUITY 115 (1987). On debt 
forgiveness or release as part of the practice of interstate relations among sovereign states, see ODETTE 
LIENAU, RETHINKING SOVEREIGN DEBT: POLITICS, REPUTATION, AND LEGITIMACY IN MODERN 
FINANCE (2014). On destituent power, see Giorgio Agamben, What Is a Destituent power?, 32 ENV’T & 
PLAN. D: SOC’Y & SPACE 65 (2014), which I discuss below. 
59. G.W.F. HEGEL, EARLY THEOLOGICAL WRITINGS 197–98 (T.M. Knox trans., Univ. of Pa. 
Press 1979) (1948). 
60. Id. at 197. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 198. Miriam Leonard called my attention to the relevant passages in Hegel, for which 
I am grateful. 
63. See Leviticus, supra note 53, at 25:23. 
64. HEGEL, supra note 59, at 197 n.* (quoting Leviticus 25:23 (King James)). 
65. This Hegelian assumption may inform Hannah Arendt’s decision to deny object-like status 
to cultivated land, which she puts in the domain of “Labor” rather than “Work” in her book. ARENDT, 
supra note 44, at 138. I discuss the matter in detail in Bonnie Honig, What Kind of a Thing is Land? Hannah 
Arendt’s Object Relations, POL. THEORY (forthcoming 2016). 
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sufferance or grace of divinity, and not (as in the case of the ancient Greek lawgivers, 
Solon and Lycurgus) as an expression of political commitment to the alleviation of 
inequality. Hegel concludes: 
Since the relation of the Jews to one another as citizens was none other 
than the equal dependence of all on their invisible ruler and his visible 
servants and officials, since therefore there was strictly no citizen body at 
all, and since further that dependence eliminated the precondition of all 
political, i.e., free, laws, it follows that there could not be anything among 
the Jews resembling a constitutional law . . . .66 
We need not adjudicate the question of whether the early Israelite regime was 
a uniquely political-theological one (by contrast with the Greeks?), nor whether, if 
it were, that alone would have retarded its progress through world history. For us, 
surely, things look rather different in almost every way from Hegel’s picture. The 
idea of the land not belonging to us, but rather being on loan to us for our 
responsible and even conditional use (in Jefferson’s term, in “usufruct to the 
living”67) is surely a useful supplement of virtue (in Aristotle’s terms) to the 
thoroughgoing market relations of use, in which a certain fantasy of property is 
otherwise now embedded. And the idea of a people relating to itself through the 
mediation of an external agency, perhaps even an object that enables transitions, is 
actually a way of describing the Israelites’ relation to God in the Book of Exodus.68 
This last point calls attention to the need to distinguish good from bad 
fantasies. Some enhance object permanence in ways that serve subjectivity, and 
some, making of the object a fetish or disallowing the kinds of relations that enchant 
subject and object both, stunt the subject in a kind of permanent suspended relation 
to it. Such a distinction might carry Hegelian traces insofar as we distinguish good 
from bad objects or fantasies on the basis of their capacity to supplement or 
underwrite subjectivity. But the argument can point in a different direction, perhaps 
even to suggest that understanding property relations in terms of loans and debts 
and collectivity might be preferable (both for the sake of subjectivity and for the 
environment) to the enlightenment model of ownership that generates one of the 
very problems—propertied individualism—that Hegel sought to resolve 
philosophically and politically. And, of course, we have already broached the idea 
that Hegel does not entertain: that the Sabbath is, in any case, not just given by God 
(or via an autoimmune defect or mercy of the curse), but that it is taken, by the 
resilient human agency that is never quite extinguished by the curse—but also the 
blessing—of everyday existence. 
 
66. HEGEL, supra note 59, at 198. 
67. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 6 THE WORKS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 3, 3–4 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1904) (emphasis omitted). 
68. The Hegelian reference to God as an illicit player in all this, a source of dependence where 
independence is wanted, tracks the later modern criticism of transitional objects as sources of 
dependence rather than the autonomy-enhancing artifacts that Winnicott believed them to be. 
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V. THE DAY OF (W)REST 
There is something paradoxical about casting Sabbath-power, which involves 
turning to the Sabbath, which is after all a day of rest, to animate new sites of active 
agency.69 But the Sabbath that we have recovered from Heine’s Sabbath poetry is 
not a rupture of the everyday (like Carl Schmitt’s view of the miracle, which 
grounded his view of the state of exception).70 It is in some ways continuous with 
the everyday, its enchanted and enchanting partner (and so more grounded in 
something like Franz Rosenzweig’s view of the miracle, which I argue elsewhere 
offers an important alternative to Schmitt’s account of the state of exception).71 
This view of the Sabbath as in some ways continuous with, in dialogue with, the 
secular week makes it less difficult to think of Sabbath as both power dependent 
and power generating; internal and not external. That is, this view does not fall into 
Hegel’s trap of casting the Jew as necessarily subject to external powers. Instead, we 
see here a practice that has some family resemblance to the idea of the General 
Strike: a suspension of work that presupposes the productive power of workers, but 
also generates the generative powers that may open new and different orders of 
economic life. 
Giorgio Agamben makes a similar-seeming move in a recent essay when he 
imagines an analogy between Sabbath and destituent power.72 But he seems to want 
the Sabbath without the power, the rest without the wrest.73 In “What is a destituent 
power?” Agamben turns to the Sabbath as a way of establishing the possibility of a 
kind of “inoperativeness”74 that is not the mere negation of action; a destituent 
 
69. Though it is not simply paradoxical if we return to the analogy with the General Strike: there 
is the question of whether, as Matthew Sharpe puts it (in a way that tracks the argument I make here 
about Sabbath and metamorphosis), “a strike is an instance of passivity (it stops work) or activity, as 
when people talk of taking ‘strike action’: which involves picketing, rallying, advocacy, public speaking, 
and other political actions.” Matthew Sharpe, Only Agamben Can Save Us?: Against the Messianic Turn 
Recently Adopted in Critical Theory, BIBLE & CRITICAL THEORY, 2009, at 40.1, 40.19 n.19, available at 
http://novaojs.newcastle.edu.au/ojsbct/index.php/bct/article/viewFile/272/255. 
70. See GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 56 (Kevin Attell trans., 2005). 
71. See HONIG, supra note 30, at 95–98. 
72. See generally Agamben, supra note 58. 
73. See Stefano Franchi on “the apparent paradox of passive politics” in Agamben, which 
Franchi deems problematic. Stefano Franchi, Passive Politics, CONTRETEMPS, Dec. 2004, at 30, 38. But 
there are ways out, says Franchi, id., albeit not by way of Agamben. In workerism, “Politics becomes 
passive in the sense that the canonical form of Marxist political action, the workers’ struggle against 
capital, is identified with a denial of any action at all, as Mario Tronti declared in ‘The Strategy of the 
Refusal.’” Id. But that strategy is not a politics as such (and indeed, Franchi notes, “Later in the essay 
Tronti claims that mass passivity is the first, necessary step that must however become active in 
becoming organized, political and subjective.”). Id. at 41 n.16. Thus, refusal “is only the necessary first 
step for a liberatory politics that must be followed by the creative invention of ‘new forms of life and a 
new community.’” Id. at 38. In sum, destituent power and constituent power are not alternatives, but 
collaborators. 
74. For an early discussion of inoperativeness in Agamben’s work, see GIORGIO AGAMBEN, 
HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE 61–62 (Daniel Heller-Roazen trans., 1998), where 
the notion is presented in relation to Bataille’s notion of desoeuvrement: “The only coherent way to 
understand inoperativeness is to think of it as a generic mode of potentiality that is not exhausted (like 
individual action or collective action understood as the sum of individual actions) in a transitus de potentia 
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power that is not the mere negation of its constituent counterpart.75 He claims to 
find resources in the Sabbath for a third option that escapes the charge of mere 
negation: 
The modern epoch, starting from Christianity—whose creator God 
defined himself from the origin in opposition to the deus otiosus of the 
pagans—is constitutively unable to think inoperativity except in the 
negative form of the suspension of labor. Thus one of the ways in which 
inoperativity has been thought is the feast [la festa], which, on the model of 
the Hebrew Shabbat, has been conceived essentially as a temporary 
suspension of productive activity, of melacha.76 
But he goes on: this feast could be seen as mere suspension too. So, seeking to move 
beyond mere negation, Agamben says the feast can be “defined not only by what in 
it is not done, but primarily by the fact that what is done” is what we do every day 
(eat, drink, and so on), but done differently.77 Doing everyday activities differently 
does not negate the everyday, he says. Rather the everyday “becomes undone, is 
rendered inoperative, liberated and suspended from its ‘economy’, from the reasons 
and purposes that define it during the weekdays.”78 Thus Agamben concludes, “not 
doing, in this sense, is only an extreme case of this suspension,” and not negation 
after all.79 
Here, Agamben hopes, we see a kind of cessation that is an alteration rather 
than a negation: 
If one eats [on the Sabbath], it is not done for the sake of being fed; if one 
gets dressed, it is not done for the sake of being covered up or taking 
shelter from the cold; if one wakes up, it is not done for the sake of 
working; if one walks, it is not done for the sake of going someplace; if one 
speaks, it is not done for the sake of communicating information; if one 
exchanges objects, it is not done for the sake of selling or buying.80 
And this generates a different, presumably non-negating kind of inoperativity, one 
that does not presuppose and require that which it seeks to overcome. (In this sense, 
it is singularly un-agonistic, it seems.) 
 
ad actum.” See also GIORGIO AGAMBEN: SOVEREIGNTY AND LIFE (Matthew Calarco & Steven DeCaroli 
eds., Kevin Attell trans., 2007). 
75. See generally Agamben, supra note 58. 
76. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, ELEMENTS FOR A THEORY OF DESTITUENT POWER (Stephanie 
Wakefield trans., 2013), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/236409599/AGAMBEN-Elements-
for-a-Theory-of-Destituent-Power. 
77. Agamben, supra note 58, at 69. 
78. See id. 
79. This “not doing,” which is not negation, is identified by Agamben with Bartleby, the 
Melville character much beloved by many critical theorists from Deleuze to Agamben. Id. I examine 
the consequences of critical theory’s Bartleby-love, also in the context of Sabbath-power, in my essay, 
Charged: Debt, Power, and the Politics of the Flesh in Shakespeare’s Merchant, Melville’s Moby-Dick, and Eric 
Santner’s The Weight of All Flesh, my reply to Eric Santner’s Tanner Lectures, in THE WEIGHT OF ALL 
FLESH: ON THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF POLITICAL THEOLOGY (Kevis Goodman ed.) (forthcoming 
2015). 
80. Agamben, supra note 58, at 69. 
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It is difficult, however, to see how destituent power can escape, through a kind 
of stipulated purism, the charges of negativity and essentialism (as if, like Aristotle, 
we could claim some relations are all virtue and no use or pleasure).81 And although 
Agamben uses the term destituent power, his focus is not—as it is in Heine’s poem, 
possibly malgré lui—on the collective and sensorial powers we exercise to make 
Sabbath (or take it) and, later, unmake it or bid it goodbye. Still, we may borrow 
from Agamben the insight that resistance requires some unplugging, as it were, from 
our current investments in forms of agency and power that—whatever their 
merits—also re-embed us further in hierarchical institutions and arrangements. 
Sabbath, in the privative sense, is not enough, but it is necessary to its more 
generative aspect, the generation of Sabbath-power, and conversely—and this is 
key—Sabbath-power is itself necessary to the capacity to unplug, as it were.82 
Sabbath cannot deliver the equality it stands for, however, unless those who 
observe it are active participants in its egalitarian project, and this (contra Agamben) 
through both destituent and constituent forms of power. Analogously, we may say 
with Winnicott, having the blanket is not enough, nor is finding comfort in it. It 
must also be the child’s partner in play, if it is to “work.” As Richard Dienst puts it 
in The Bonds of Debt, the way forward—what he calls “a radical politics of 
indebtedness”—may require combining two utopian attitudes that “might at first 
appear opposed or contradictory.”83 The first entails an acceptance of the fact that 
“human productivity itself requires indebtedness as a kind of irreducible technical 
 
81. Agamben gets this far by tracking a traditional Judaic view of the Sabbath as nonpurposive, 
in contrast with the purposiveness of everyday life. But does this idea of a nonpurposiveness cleansed 
of purpose escape the charge of negation? It may be useful here to recall Jacques Derrida’s reading of 
Aristotle’s three kinds of friendship, in which friendship as virtue is treated as separate and distinct 
from the other two: friendship as pleasure and friendship as use. JACQUES DERRIDA, THE POLITICS 
OF FRIENDSHIP 203 (George Collins trans., Verso 2005) (1994). Derrida’s reading of Aristotle shows 
how, on his own account, friendship as virtue, pleasure, and use are decidedly co-implicated. In casting 
the Sabbath as the uniquely pure time and space of non-use, Agamben returns us to the purity and 
essentialism of Aristotle on virtue friendship. There may be a traditional Judaic view of Sabbath that is 
similarly essentialist and pure, but it is one view among others. Moreover, the idea of destituent power, 
in the name of which this nonpurposive Sabbath practice is recovered, is conceived by contrast with 
constitutent power. Thus, the recalibration that Agamben seeks is marked by this negation, surely, as it 
is by his earlier critique of Negri and by Negri’s own response, in which Negri charges that Agamben 
does not provide politics with any principle of productivity or activity. (Thanks to Peg Birmingham on 
this point.) 
82. Sometimes this unplugging may alter the operation of the system we seek to alter. In the 
case of Sabbath-power, it may also point to different systems—a precapitalist form of life that once 
supported and was supported by Jubilee, or a postcapitalist form that is not quite yet imaginable. I 
assume that Julia Reinhard Lupton is working in the vicinity of these ideas when she adds to the tisch 
of Arendt a “Sabbath symbolism [that] is no mere ornament,” as Sanford Budick put it in his review of 
JULIA REINHARD LUPTON, THINKING WITH SHAKESPEARE: ESSAYS ON POLITICS AND LIFE (2011). 
Sanford Budick, Book Review, 111 MODERN PHILOLOGY E323, E323–24 (2014). “For Lupton,” as 
Budick says, such imagery “betokens a supplementary dimension of the thinking of shared or interim 
space. She pursues varieties of this idea through the writings of Giorgio Agamben on a ‘Sabbath’ of 
‘inoperative’ work (56–57, 237) and even finds it in Hamlet’s ‘Sabbatarian “let it be”’ (241).” Id. at E324. 
83. DIENST, supra note 52, at 183–84. 
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prosthesis,” and this is well pursued through practices like microcredit.84 And the 
second, “associated with Jubilee,” “insists that people must always be able to refuse 
the obligations built into their circumstances, and insofar as these obligations can 
be ruptured by an act of will . . . cancelling debts or going bankrupt is always 
somehow liberating. Not just once, but over and over.”85 
VI. FANTASY AND WORLD-MAKING 
Heine’s Sabbath poetry can be what Arendt says it is: a bid for inclusion. Or it 
can be the story of incandescent resilient souls who, week after week, wash off the 
dust of oppression and division to re-experience and claim equality, for a moment, 
so that this equality may, as Franz Rosenzweig hoped and thought it should, be seen 
to be always already operating in every week, available to be (re)activated. Thus 
understood, Sabbath is not merely an exceptional refuge that punctuates the weeks 
in their interminable secular, hierarchical sameness. Since Arendt seems to distance 
herself from Heine’s belief that he, as a singular poet, dwells in Sabbatical 
exceptionality all the time and is not himself subject to the cycle of metamorphosis, 
we may see in her some openness to the idea presented here, that Sabbath-power is 
best seen as an intensification of the everyday—not, like Heine’s self-exception 
from the dog life of the Jews, a distinct alternative to it, and certainly not something 
whose purity with respect to the profane should be assumed. 
Heine sometimes thought that he, the poet and lord of dreams who lived in a 
permanent Sabbath state (he thought), could do something like the work of the 
Sabbath and ennoble a people made ignoble by circumstances. Arendt had little 
patience for such aspirations. Indeed, the entire “hidden tradition,” to which she 
gives shape in her essay by tracking the efforts of even admirable conscious pariahs, 
is one conjugated only by individuals and limited thereby. No action in concert 
occurs here and no alteration results in the conditions of worldliness. Arendt wants 
to credit the insight and courage of those who chose the path of the pariah rather 
than the parvenu. Their acts were not without consequence. But, she recognizes, 
they operated in limiting situations and their example can be no model for us now. 
They had no political significance.86 They cared for the world but could not act 
effectively upon it. 
Still, she may have been too quick in underestimating Heine’s Sabbath poetry. 
Wending its way in and out of German orientalism and philhellenism, through the 
Arabian Tales, the Greek pagan gods, Judaic monotheism, and the faith of every 
major religion in rebirth, restoration, and renewal, Heine’s practically Melvillean, 
even glossolalic, Sabbath poetry may be seen as constituting a world of hybridity 
before such a world is possible. Since fantasy underwrites facticity (in Winnicott and 
elsewhere too), and since such fantasizing is crucially important to the world-making 
 
84. Id. at 184. 
85. Id. 
86. ARENDT, supra note 3, at 288–91. 
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on behalf of which Arendt herself wrote, such individual efforts may not be 
sufficient to effect world transformation. But they may be necessary. That Arendt 
at some level knew this is suggested by the fact that she thought this “hidden 
tradition” was worth recovering, reconstructing, exploring, and disseminating. 
For us, now, Heine’s poem calls attention to the power of Sabbath. Sabbath-
power (experienced not only in the weekly ritual but also in practices of land and 
debt sabbatical known as sh’mita and Jubilee) underwrites egalitarian practices that 
act legally to suspend (the force of ) law in order to foment restoration and 
rebeginning.87 Another example we could add to those already mentioned is that of 
the debtor sanctuaries at Whitefriars, the Mint, and elsewhere, into which no bailiffs 
were allowed and which protected the lives (and sometimes also the assets) of those 
imperiled by debt and otherwise fated to bare life in debtors’ prisons.88 
Returning to Arendt’s essay, these readings of Heine, Arendt, Hegel, 
Winnicott, and others invite us to see each of Arendt’s four pariahs not, as we may 
have done at the start, as more or less wanting in relation to a standard of action or 
pariah consciousness. Instead, we may ask what we stand to acquire from each, what 
are each of the pariah’s possible “contributions in” to the subject, according to that 
pariah’s own properties? All four of Arendt’s exemplary pariahs contribute to a 
repertoire of resilience that includes rebellion, visionary poetry, Sabbath-power, the 
sort of rights claiming that appeals to official powers, and a humanism expressed 
by way of mockery of those very same official powers. Even Heine’s mystical 
naturalism has a role to play here, surely, if we treat Arendt’s figures as conjugators 
of a shared tradition and not (as she herself sometimes seems to do) as offering a 
menu of distinct alternatives. As we know from the example of Strike Debt: 
rebellion, poetry, Sabbath-power, rights claiming, and mockery of the powers that 
be all presuppose and require each other when the political aim is to disenchant 
 
87. “The land was ours before we were the land’s” is the first line of ROBERT FROST, The Gift 
Outright, in THE POETRY OF ROBERT FROST 348, 348 (Edward Connery Lathem ed., 1969), a poem 
caught in the colonial mentality of promise that hides dispossession but is available, I would argue, for 
redirection given its idea that land comes to possess those who seek to possess it, if they give themselves 
up to it. (Thanks to George Kateb for this reference.) 
The land was ours before we were the land’s. / She was our land more than a hundred years 
/ Before we were her people. She was ours / In Massachusetts, in Virginia, / 
But we were England’s, still colonials, / Possessing what we still were unpossessed by, / 
Possessed by what we now no more possessed. / Something we were withholding made us 
weak / Until we found out that it was ourselves / We were withholding from our land of 
living, / And forthwith found salvation in surrender. 
Id. Does this idea of “salvation in surrender,” now Christian, not Jewish, pass Hegel’s various tests? 
88. I thank Shaun McVeigh for calling my attention to Whitefriars. On debtor sanctuaries, see 
Nigel Stirk, Fugitive Meanings: The Literary Construction of a London Debtors’ Sanctuary in the Eighteenth Century, 
24 BRIT. J. FOR EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 175 (2001). Stirk’s focus is on the Mint, the 
last surviving debtors’ sanctuary . . . which stayed beyond the law until 1723. The Mint 
occupied both a physical space close to the centre of London, and a place in ongoing debates 
about the liberty of debtors who faced imprisonment for non-payment and the property 
rights of creditors. At a time when the force of English law was relied upon to defend liberty 
and property, the continued presence in London of an area the law could not reach was 
highly problematic. 
Id. at 175 (footnote omitted). 
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existing institutions in the hope of enchanting new ones. None by themselves can 
succeed, but then most of those engaged in politics know that, in the words of Strike 
Debt, we “are not a loan.”89 
That said, we are always at risk of being nothing at all, as Heine showed he 
knew when he recorded in his memoir this anecdote about the glossolalic 
meanderings of his name: 
Here in France my German name, “Heinrich,” was translated into “Henri” 
just after my arrival in Paris. I had to resign myself to it and finally name 
myself thus in this country, for the word “Heinrich” did not appeal to the 
French ear and the French make everything in the world nice and easy for 
themselves. They were also incapable of pronouncing the name “Henri 
Heine” correctly, and for most people my name is Mr. Enri Enn; many 
abbreviate this to “Enrienne,” and some called me Mr. Un Rien.90 
Which is to say, “a nothing.”91 Un rien, the pariah fate. Here Heine enlists the pariah 
resources of resilience evident in Arendt’s inadvertent list: humor, 
counterglossolalia, mockery, Sabbath-power, rights claiming, and more are the 
constituent and destituent forms of action available to those lacking, for the 
moment, access to constituent power. They may even serve as preliminaries to it, 
or necessary conditions of it. But they are not its substitutes. 
 
 
89. STRIKE DEBT!, supra note 1, describes its mission as follows: 
Rolling Jubilee is a Strike Debt project that buys debt for pennies on the dollar, but instead 
of collecting it, abolishes it. Together we can liberate debtors at random through a campaign 
of mutual support, good will, and collective refusal. Debt resistance is just the beginning. 
Join us as we imagine and create a new world based on the common good, not Wall Street 
profits. 
A Bailout of the People for the People, supra note 54. 
90. DANIEL HELLER-ROAZEN, ECHOLALIAS: ON THE FORGETTING OF LANGUAGE 35 
(2005). 
91. Id. 
